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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A.

Nature of the Case.

The issues presented in this case arise out of a boundary dispute between Appellant East Side
Highway District ("District"), on the one hand, and three (3) generations of the Delavan family, on
the other hand. The Respondents are Greg and Ellen Delavan, collectively referred to herein for ease
ofreference as "Greg." Greg's predecessors-in-title to the property at issue, which lies adjacent to
property claimed by the District, include his late father, Jack Delavan ("Jack"), and his late
grandfather, Oliver Delavan ("Oliver").
For purposes of orientation, South Boothe Park Road, which is under the jurisdiction of the
District, enters property platted years ago as Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside. Tr. Ex. ZZ. 1 The
parties' primary focus of dispute relates to the boundaries and ownership of a portion of property
colored in yellow on Appendix B. 2 The area highlighted in yellow on Appendix B is sometimes
referred to herein as "the disputed triangle." The disputed triangle abuts the shore of Lake Coeur
d'Alene. Near the western terminus of the disputed triangle lies a concrete boat ramp (labeled as
such on Appendix B).
The District's claim to the disputed triangle is asserted under two theories. First, the District
claims that the boundary between the parties' parcels is defined by a chainlink fence which was
generally located on portions along the southern edge of the disputed triangle. In opposition, Delavan

'As used herein, the acronym"Tr. Ex." refers to exhibits admitted at trial and contained in the
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits. A copy of Tr. Ex. ZZ is attached as Appendix A for the Court's
convenience.
'Appendix B consists of Exhibit B to the Court's "Second Amended Judgment," which was
entered January 25, 2018. R., Vol. I, pp. 74-77.
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alleges that the fence was never intended to be a boundary, but rather a barrier between the ongoing
marina operations on the Delavan property and the boat ramp. The District also claims that the boat
ramp constitutes an extension of South Boothe Park Road, and accordingly asserts a right of
ownership pursuant to J.C. § 40-202(3). Delavan in turn claims that all prior use of the boat ramp,
and any travelways lying within the disputed triangle, was (and remains) permissive. 3
Trial was bifurcated into two (2) phases. The first phase, which included nine (9) witnesses
and over one hundred (I 00) exhibits, addressed the District's claim to the disputed triangle under
the theory ofboundary by agreement. The District Court found in favor of Greg. Trial later continued
to a second phase, which included six (6) witnesses and additional exhibits. The second phase
resulted in a judgment determining the location of the parties' common boundary, which was
consistent with the location urged by Greg. This appeal followed.

B.

Course of the Proceedings.

On April 24, 2012, the District filed its "Complaint for Quiet Title and Declaratory
Judgment" against Greg. R., Vol. I, pp. 14-18. The District asserted two primary claims for relief.
First, the District essentially sought declaratory relief that it was entitled to ownership and control
3

For purposes of orientation, attached hereto as Appendices C through Hare the following.
Appendix C (Tr. Ex. BBB) depicts Greg's son Jesse, in approximately 2007, in front of a "Private
Entrance Slow" sign, looking westward toward the Lake from the Delavan driveway which is near
the end of the chip-sealed portion of South Boothe Park Road. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 514-15. Appendix
D (Tr. Ex. CCC) depicts Greg's daughter Michaela in the same general vicinity. The photo was also
taken in approximately 2007. The "Private Entrance" sign was installed by Greg's grandfather,
Oliver. Tr., Vol. I, p. 515. Appendix E (Tr. Ex. 000) is a photograph looking east from the
terminus of the boat launch. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 466-73. At trial, Greg hand-wrote on Ex. 000
(Appendix E) where the paved portion of South Boothe Park Road ends (labeled "chip seal" on the
Exhibit). Id. Greg also circled two posts that were located along the general line of a chainlink fence
previously installed by Oliver in the 1950s. Tr., pp. 4 74-76. Attached as Exhibit F (Tr. Ex. PPP) is
a relatively contemporary photograph with the same general view as Appendix F (looking eastward
from the terminus of the boat launch).
2

of the disputed triangle pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 40-202(3). The District alleged
that the disputed triangle, including the only concrete boat launch in Kootenai County to which the
District makes claim, constitutes a public right-of-way that has been maintained by the District for
in excess of five (5) years. 4 The District also asserted a claim for "boundary by agreement," alleging
that Greg's grandfather Oliver and representatives of the District had agreed that a chainlink fence
on the south side of the disputed triangle constitutes the parties' common boundary. Id.
On July 13, 2012, Greg filed his Answer, denying the District's claims for relief. R., Vol.
I, pp. 19-27. Greg also asserted counterclaims for trespass, quiet title, and declaratory relief. Id.
Through his counterclaims for quiet title and declaratory relief, Greg sought an adjudication that the
disputed triangle constitutes a portion of his property and that the common boundary between his
property and the District's adjacent property is consistent with the northern line of the disputed
triangle. Id.
On July 11, 2013, the video deposition of Jack Delavan, Greg's father, was taken. R., Vol.
1, pp. 130-32. At the time of his deposition, Jack was eighty-four (84) years old. R., Vol. II, p. 313.
The parties ultimately stipulated to entry of an order allowing Jack's deposition testimony to be
admitted at trial due to Jack's age and declining health. R., Vol. I, pp. 162-63. 5
On October 21,2014, the District moved for partial summary judgment. R., Vol. I, pp.17374. The District argued that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact that the area
encompassed by the disputed triangle had been (1) maintained by the District, and (2) used by the

4

Tr., Vol. II, p. 370.

'Jack passed away on December 26, 2015, a few weeks after the initial phase of trial. R.,
Vol. III, p. 679. His deposition transcript was admitted at trial as Exhibit EEEE.
3

public for five (5) years, all as provided for in J.C.§ 40-202(3). R., Vol. II, p. 304. Greg opposed
the District's motion for partial summary judgment. Greg asserted that there were genuine issues
of material fact as to whether or not the public's use of the boat launch had been permissive given
the consensual nature of the public's use which had been allowed by generations of the Delavan
family. Greg further asserted that the Delavans, as opposed to the District, had maintained the boat
launch. R., Vol. II, pp. 377-84. Following hearing and argument, the District Court entered its Order
denying the District's motion for partial summary judgment. R., Vol. II, pp. 439-40.
On January I 5, 2015, the District filed its "Motion for Separate Trials." R., Vol. II, pp. 45758. The District requested that the Court first try the issue of boundary agreement, arguing that "[t]he
boundary by agreement cause of action may well resolve in its entirety all issues before the Court."
Id. On May 22, 2015, the parties filed their "Stipulation for Separate Trials." R., Vol. II, pp. 50304. The parties stipulated, in the interest of promoting judicial economy, that they try the boundary
by agreement issue first. On June 9, 2015, in accordance with the parties' Stipulation, the Court
entered its "Order Separating Trials." R., Vol. II, pp. 510-11. The Court's Order provided that the
boundary by agreement issue would proceed to trial and, if necessary, any remaining issues would
be rescheduled for trial at a later date. Id.
On November 16, 17, and 18, 2015, the District's claim of boundary by agreement was tried
to the Court. The Reporter's Transcript on appeal includes a separate five hundred fifty-six (556)
page transcript of those proceedings. This transcript will be referred to herein as "Tr., Vol. I."6 Trial
proceeded for three (3) days. Testimony was given by eight (8) witnesses. In excess of one hundred

6

A second reporter's transcript is included with the record on appeal. This transcript,
consisting of four hundred twenty-eight (428) pages, encompasses the second phase of trial, held
May 15 and 16, 2017. This volume shall be referred to herein as "Tr., Vol. II."
4

(100) exhibits were admitted. Consistent with the parties' prior Stipulation and the Court's Order,
the video-taped deposition of Jack Delavan was offered and admitted. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 549-51; Tr.
Ex. EEEE.
On November 17, 2015, the District filed its "Notice of Objection to Designated Portions of
Jack Delavan's Deposition." R., Vol. II, pp. 575-76. On November 19, 2015, Greg responded to
the District's objections. R., Vol. III, pp. 616-22. On December 1, 2015, the Court entered its "Order
Re: Objections to Deposition Testimony of Jack Delavan." R., Vol. III, pp. 623-25. The Court
largely denied all of the District's objections, save one, both as a matter of evidentiary practice and
because the District had preserved no objections at the time of the deposition. Id.
Following post-trial briefing, the District Court entered its March 28, 2016 "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and the Verdict" (the "Verdict"). R., Vol. III, pp. 767-69. The Court's Verdict
included the following findings:

I.

The boat launch is located in the northwest corner of Lot 19 of Lakeshore
Addition to Sunnyside Plat.

2.

The Plat created thirty-six (36) lots, each with a width of 100 feet.

3.

Oliver Delavan, grandfather to Defendant Greg Delavan, acquired title to
Lots 19-22 in 1945.

4.

John Boothe, one of the original parties who recorded the Plat, conveyed
additional property lying north of Lot 19 to Oliver Delavan in 1949.

5.

On January 21, 195 5, Boothe executed a Quit Claim deed conveying property
to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District. That property lies north of the
property conveyed to Oliver Delavan in 1949.

6.

Plaintiff is a successor-in-interest to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District.

7.

A concrete boat launch was constructed in 1955, and is in the same
approximate location in Lot 19 today.
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8.

A fence was later constructed between the southern edge of the boat launch
next to the Delavan property.

9.

Defendants and their predecessors permissively allowed the boat launch to
be placed in their Lot 19 and to be utilized by the public. The fence along the
southern edge of the disputed triangle did not constitute a boundary between
the Delavan property and the District's property.

10.

The District has not maintained the boat launch over the last couple of
decades; rather, the Delavans and the Kootenai County Department of Parks
and Waterways have maintained it.

Id. In addition, the Court's Verdict made the following conclusions:
1.

The District failed to prove, even by a preponderance of the evidence, either
required element of a boundary by agreement: (I) an uncertain or disputed
boundary, and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary.

2.

Use of the boat launch by all parties other than the Delavans or their
predecessors-in-interest, since its construction, has been permissive.

Id. Following entry of the Verdict, the only remaining claims were (I) whether the District could
assert a claim to the disputed triangle under J.C. § 40-202(3) and, if not, (2) the location of the
parties' common boundary.
On May 16, 2016, Greg moved for partial summary judgment on the District's claim under
J.C. § 40-202(3). Through its initial Verdict, entered on the District's claim of boundary by
agreement, the District Court found that prior use of the boat launch by all parties other than the
Delavans had been permissive. R., Vol. III, p. 768. Given this finding, Greg argued that the District
could not assert a claim of ownership to the disputed triangle under J.C. § 40-202(3) given this
Court's rationale in Lattin v. Adams County. 149 Idaho 497, 236 P.3d 1257 (2010). R., Vol. III, pp.
774-80. The District opposed Greg's motion. R., Vol. III, pp. 834-44.
Following briefing and argument, the District Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and
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Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." R., Vol. III, pp. 853-60. The
Court found:

It is undisputed that the boat launch installation and public use was
permissive. In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Verdict" at p. 2, the
Court found that "Defendants and their predecessors permitted that boat launch to be
placed in their Lot 19 and be utilized by the public" in 1955 and that, "[u]se of the
boat launch by all parties other than Defendants or their predecessors-in-interests,
since its construction, has been permissive."

This Court finds that allowing Plaintiff to obtain a prescriptive right to the
boat launch constructed and used based on permission would be an unconstitutional
application ofl.C. § 40-202(3). To allow permissive use to ripen into a prescriptive
right without any notice would be an unconstitutional taking of Defendants' property
in violation of Defendants' due process rights.
R., Vol. III, pp. 856-58.
Greg further moved the Court for entry of judgment, consistent with the Court's prior
Verdict, asking the Court to fix the location of the common boundary between the properties of Greg
and the District. R., Vol. III, pp. 861-66. The District opposed Greg's motion. R., Vol. III, pp. 87984.
Following briefing and argument, the Court entered its "Order Denying Delavans' Motion
for Entry of Judgment." R., Vol. III, pp. 893-95. The District Court reasoned:
In adjudicating the trial on Plaintiffs boundary by agreement claim, the Court
found that the fence lying south of the boat ramp was not a boundary, and found,
based on the evidence presented, that the boat launch was on Delavans' property.
While the Court did find that the 1910 Plat created 36 lots each with a width of 100
feet, the Court also found that John Boothe "conveyed additional property lying north
of Lot 19 to Oliver Delavan in 1949." This was an unplatted parcel, and its
boundaries were created in the 1949 deed from Boothe to Delavan, not the 1910 Plat.
The Court did not rule on the exact boundaries of the property conveyed in the 1949
deed from Boothe to Delavans or the location or extent of Boothe Park Road as it
existed in 1910 or 1949.
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Id. Accordingly, a second phase of trial was set for purposes of receiving evidence and argument
as to the location of the common boundary line between the Delavan and District properties.
Phase two of trial commenced on May 15, 2017, and extended two days. A transcript of
proceedings during Phase two is separately included on appeal (consisting of four hundred twentyeight (428) pages), and is referred to herein by the acronym "Tr., Vol. II." Following trial, the
District Court entered its June 20, 2017 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Verdict."'
The District Court found in part:

I.

Oliver Delavan, grandfather to Greg, acquired title to Lots 19-22 as platted
in I 945 from Lewis Wassmer, for a total of four hundred (400) feet of lake
frontage.

2.

For an unknown reason, there was a problem with the lot numbering as
shown on the Plat versus what was possessed on the ground, resulting in
0 Ii ver Delavan possessing one hundred (I 00) fewer feet oflake frontage than
he possessed title to pursuant to the Plat and his deeds.

3.

John Boothe, one of the original parties who recorded the Plat, conveyed
additional unplatted property lying between Lots 18 and 19 as platted to
Oliver Delavan in 1949. This property was described in the deed as being
bounded to the northeast and northwest by Boothe Park Road as it existed in
1949, along the road, and then along the right-of-way line of Boothe Park
Road to the meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene.

4.

Based on the evidence presented, the Court infers that the deed from Boothe
to Delavan was intended to be reparative of the numbering problem and
granted Delavan the amount oflake frontage for which he owned by title. The
conveyance of the unplatted lot was intended to provide one hundred (100)
feet of lake frontage.

5.

Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949 did not reach the meander line of
Lake Coeur d'Alene, and did not continue past Oliver Delavan's driveway.

7

A copy of the June 20, 2017 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Verdict" was
inadvertently omitted from the Clerk's Record. The District previously moved the Court to augment
the record with the same. For the Court's convenience, a copy of the referenced "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Verdict" is attached hereto as Appendix G.
8

6.

In 1949, there was no boat ramp in existence at the end of Boothe Park Road,
and thus no reason for the road to continue to the Lake.

See Appendix G.
On September 12, 2017, the District Court entered Judgment on the Verdict that followed
phase two of trial. R., Vol. I, pp. 39-42. The Amended Judgment deleted superficial prefatory
language at the direction of this Court. Ultimately, a Second Amended Judgment was entered, on
January 25, 2018, to correct a scrivener's error in the legal description. R., Vol. I, pp. 61-64. The
District has timely appealed from the Second Amended Judgment.

C.

Concise Statement of Facts.
1.

The Plat of Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside.

In July of! 910, John Boothe ("Boothe") and others recorded the Plat ofLakeshore Addition
to Sunnyside. Trial Exs. A; I. Among other things, the Plat created thirty-seven (3 7) separate
waterfront lots (numbered Lot 2 through Lot 38), each measuring one hundred (100) feet in width.
Id. Each of these thirty-seven (37) lots, as platted, fronts on Lake Coeur d'Alene.
Geremy Russell, PLS, who testified as an expert for the District, concurred that each of the
thirty-seven (37) waterfront lots was intended to be one hundred (100) feet in width. Tr., Vol. I, p.
384. Besides the Plat itself, all other evidence offered by the District supports this conclusion. For
example, the District offered a 2001 Survey by Scott Rasor, PLS. Tr. Ex. 21. Mr. Rasor' s Survey,
at Note 7, states, "The lots for Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside were laid out from prior surveys and
the original Plat at 100 feet wide and with parallel lines." Id. The Plat also included an unplatted area
lying between Lots 18 and 19. While the Plat indicated that the unplatted area between Lots 18 and
19 had two hundred (200) feet of frontage on Lake Coeur d'Alene, all parties, including Russell, the

9

District's expert, concurred that such was not the case in fact. Tr., Vol. I, p. 406. Rasor's 2001
Record of Survey measured the actual frontage of the unplatted area between Lots 18 and 19 at
102.58 feet. Tr. Ex. 21. 8
The 102.58 feet as surveyed by Rasor includes 34.20 feet of property that consists of the
disputed triangle and boat launch. A visual depiction of the disputed triangle, showing the 34.20 feet
measurement, was admitted at trial as Exhibit CCCC (which consisted of an excerpt of several
certified Kootenai County Mapping and Assessment documents introduced by the District as Exhibit
18). 9
The Plat is also noteworthy in its depiction of roadways. In this regard, the Plat shows a
roadway entering the unplatted area between Lots 18 and 19. Tr. Ex. 1. The Court should note,
however, that this road, as depicted, stops short of the shoreline of Lake Coeur d'Alene. This is
particularly instructive given that all other roads shown on the Plat (Ex. 1) extend to outer boundaries
of the platted properties. In other words, the road shown on the Plat as being located in the area
between Lots 18 and 19, by intention, is the only road that has a terminus other than an outer
boundary of the Plat. Russell acknowledged the same at trial. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 389.
Currently, there is an extension off of South Boothe Park Road into the unplatted area.
However, South Boothe Park Road was not actually located in a manner consistent with the road
as depicted on the Plat. The District acknowledges as much:
Expert witness Jeremy Russell ... testified [that] without courses and distances, the
precise location of the public roads not situated on lot lines could not be determined
with precision. One of the depicted roads extended into the unnumbered lot area

8

A copy ofRasor's Survey (Ex. 21) is included as Appendix H.

9

A copy of Exhibit CCCC is attached as Appendix I.
10

[between Lots 18 and 19]. The road in this area is shown as terminating near the
shore of Lake Coeur d'Alene.
R., Vol. III, p. 634.

2.

The Problem With the Plat of Lakeshore Addition.

The Plat of Lakeshore Addition has created its share of problems.

The following is

specifically noted on the face ofRasor's 2001 Survey:
MR. JOHN BOOTHE, ONE OF THE ORIGINAL PLATTORS, STATED THAT
AN ERROR OF 100 FEET HAD BEEN MADE IN LOCATING ONE OF THE
LOTS AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN LOT
NUMBERS. THE EFFECT OF THE DIFFERENCES IN LOT NUMBERING IS TO
SHIFTTHENUMBERS l00FEETNORTH.FOREXAMPLE,THEORIGINALLY
PLATTED LOT 28 BECOMES LOT 29, AND THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED
UNNUMBERED PORTION OF LAKESHORE ADDITION TO SUNNYSIDE
BECOMES LOT 19 ....
Tr. Ex. 21. In other words, for reasons still unknown, the original platting parties made an error that
resulted in a northward "shift" in the numbering system used for Lots 19 through 38. For example,
Lot 20 becomes Lot 21, Lot 19 becomes Lot 20, and so on. However, because Lot 19, as shown on
the Plat, becomes "Lot 20," Lot 19, by necessity, must be located northward in the unplatted area
between Lots 18 and 19.
The existence of this error is conceded by all, although its origin is unknown. Russell
testified:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Well . . . the lot numbering on the Plat didn't change but the legal
descriptions utilized today changed?
You're absolutely right.
Okay.
Some of the conveyances were incorrect, you're right.
[N]o one knows why the problem really came about, correct?
I believe that's true.
And it's lost to the vagaries of time with this particular Plat?
I agree.
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Q.
A.

And things are mixed up to the extent of I 00 feet in certain area?
I agree.

Tr., Vol. I, pp. 375-76.

3.

The Conveyances to Oliver Delavan.

In 1945, Lewis Wasmer, conveyed Lots 19 through 22 to Greg's grandparents, Oliver and
Edna Delavan. Tr. Exs. C and 2. 10 Russell acknowledged that it was reasonable to infer, from the
Plat and the Wasmer to Oliver conveyance, that Oliver intended to acquire four hundred (400) feet
of property. Tr., Vol. I, p. 377.
Oliver subsequently sold Lot 22 to Lawrence Gridley, retaining Lots 19 through 21. See Ex.
EEEE (Jack Delavan deposition) at p. 11. Russell again concurred that it was reasonable to infer that
Oliver, in retaining Lots 19 through 21, believed that he had acquired property with a total width
of three hundred (300) feet. Tr., Vol. I, p. 378. Jack testified that his father Oliver started building
a house on the Delavan property in late 1946. Id. at pp. 13-14. The home that Oliver constructed is
the present-day home of Greg. Jack lived on the property, in a tent, while his father built the home.
Id. at p. 15. At the time (1946), there was no boat launch located on the Delavan property. Id. at pp.
17, 20-21.
In 1950, Jack started construction on his own house which was located south of the home that
Oliver had constructed on Lot I 9. Id. at p. 19. Jack completed the home and moved into the same
in 1952. Id. There was no boat launch on Lot 19 when Jack completed his home. Id. at pp. 20-21.

10

As a historical aside, prior to Wasmer's acquisition, Lots 19 through 22 were the original
sight of Camp Easton. See Ex. EEEE (Jack Delavan deposition) at pp. 13, 38. Camp Easton, as
ultimately relocated from the Delavan property, was later the subject of this Court's Opinion in
Camp Easton Forever, Inc. v. Inland Northwest Council Boy Scouts of America, 156 Idaho 893,332
P.3d 805 (2014).
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Jack lived on the property for over sixty (60) years, until his passing in December of 2015.
In August of 1949, four (4) years after Oliver acquired Lot 19 and three (3) years after he
started construction on his home, Boothe made a conveyance to Oliver of a portion of the unplatted
area located between Lots 18 and 19. Tr. Exs. D; 3. It appears that by then, Boothe had become
aware of the errors arising from the lot numbers used on the Plat. It also appears that since Oliver
had purchased four (4) lots, each measuring one hundred (100) feet in width, that Boothe needed to
rectify the situation. Russell concurred with the foregoing, and described the Boothe to Oliver
conveyance as "a corrective action." Tr., Vol. I, p.379.
Boothe deeded the following-described property to Oliver:
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 19, as originally platted, Lakeshore
Addition to Sunnyside, Section 33, Township 50 North, Range 3 West B.M., thence
North 79°58' East to the West boundary of the existing County road; thence along
the existing right-of-way line of said County road to its intersection with the meander
line of Lake Coeur d'Alene; thence Southerly along the meander line of said Lake
Coeur d'Alene, to the point of beginning, said land being in the County of Kootenai,
State ofldaho.
Tr. Exs. D; 3. Id. The key "call" in this deed is the "boundary of the existing County road" as of
August 17, 1949, the date of the conveyance. As acknowledged by Russell, the roads in place today
were not constructed in the locations generally shown on the Plat. Tr., Vol. I, p. 387.
Inferentially, Boothe's effort to correct the problems that the Plat had created for Oliver were
perhaps motivated by the Coeur d'Alene Highway District's expression of interest in utilizing the
unplatted area between Lots 18 and 19 as a public park. Tr. Ex. 4. For example, Coeur d'Alene
Highway District's Meeting Minutes of August 31, 1949 express the District's belief, at that time,
that the area between Lots 18 and 19 had been dedicated (which was not the case) and that "[t]his
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property is held as public property and shall never be deprived of public use." Id. 11

4.

The Location of "the Existing County Road" on August
17, 1949.

The location of"the existing County road" as of the date of the corrective conveyance from
Boothe to Oliver was not established by the District at trial. The District offered no evidence of the
location of "the existing County road" or "the existing right-of-way line of said County road," as
those terms were used in the conveyance from Boothe to Oliver. In fact, none of the District's
witnesses had any personal knowledge of the condition of the road as it existed in August of 1949.
The only person with personal knowledge as to the conditions in existence in 1949 was Jack
Delavan. In this regard, Jack testified as follows:
•

There was no boat ramp on Lot 19 or in the unplatted area between Lots 18
and 19 in 1946.

•

There was no boat ramp on Lot 19 or in the unplatted area between Lots 18
and 19 in 1952.

•

Boothe Park Road stopped at the comer of the Boothe Park property (i.e., the
unplatted portion between Lots 18 and 19).

•

"Boothe Park Road never . . . went past the corner of our [Delavan]
property."

•

The road didn't go to the boat ramp in 1949 because the boat ramp didn't
exist.

Tr. Ex. EEEE (Jack Delavan deposition) at pp. 17, 19-20, 53, 54, 56-58.
The District's own evidence corroborated Jack's testimony that the road ended at the Park's
eastern boundary between 1949 and 1956. The District offered Ray Kindler's 1956 unrecorded

11

In point of fact, the Plat contained no dedication language with respect to the unplatted area
between Lots 18 and 19.
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"Survey," which specifically labeled the "roadway" in a manner wholly-consistent with Jack's
testimony. Tr. Ex. 9. Kindler showed the roadway as terminating at "Boothe Park," at a concrete
monument near the corner of the Delavan property. Exhibit PPP illustrates the Delavan driveway as
it exits South Boothe Park Road. According to both Jack and Kindler, the road did not extend further
beyond this point. Hence, in order to determine the northern boundary of the property Boothe
conveyed to Oliver in 1949, one would have to project that road's right-of-way to its intersection
with the meander line. Kindler's survey did not do this. Kindler simply relied upon a "fence line"
rather than the projected road right-of-way line as was required by the 1949 deed from Boothe to
Oliver.

5.

The Conveyance from Boothe to the Coeur d'Alene
Highway District.

In January of 1955, Boothe executed a Quit Claim Deed to the Coeur d'Alene Highway
District. That deed conveyed property in the unplatted area between Lots 18 and 19. Tr. Exs. E; 5.
The deed essentially described a parcel of land one hundred twenty (120) feet in width, lying along
the shore of Lake Coeur d'Alene, and one hundred fifty (150) feet deep. The problems with this deed
include the following:
•

The 1955 deed to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District came six (6) years
after the 1949 Boothe Deed to Oliver.

•

Just as there wasn't two hundred (200) feet of frontage in the unplatted area
between Lots 18 and 19 at the time the Plat was recorded, there wasn't one
hundred twenty (I 20) feet of property in 1955.

•

Kindler measured the total Park frontage in 1956 as 102.5 feet. However,
Kindler's measurement included the 34.20 foot at issue in this proceeding
(the disputed triangle) because Kinder based his boundary upon the fence line
along the southern side of the disputed triangle.
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Had Kindler used the projected right-of-way line, from the road's terminus at the entry to the Park,
he would have concluded that the total frontage the District conveyed to Boothe in 1949 was 68.3
feet (102.5 feet less 34.20 feet).

6.

Installation of the Boat Launch.

In late January of 1955, a sixty (60) by twelve (12) foot concrete boat launch was installed
within the disputed triangle. Tr. Exs. K, L; and 6. Jack and Oliver were living on the property at the
time. Coeur d'Alene Press articles identified William Stark as the Secretary to the Coeur d'Alene
Highway District. Id. Jack testified as follows:
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

You indicated, when Ms. Weeks asked you some questions, that when you
saw your dad and Bill Stark out where the launch is at, that it appeared that
an agreement had been reached between them before you met Bill Stark; is
that fair?
Yes. That's fair.
And the only agreement that you've testified about that you are aware of your
father having entered into with Bill Stark was what you called the handshake
agreement?
Yeah. And they did it again for me when he was there.
I am sorry. What?
I shook hands with Bill Stark and dad turned around and shook hands with
him again because we were - the meeting was over.
But in terms of an agreement between your father and Bill Stark that the boat
launch could be maintained on what your father believed and you say your
father knew was his property, that was memorialized by a handshake?
You're correct.

Tr. Ex. EEEE (Jack Delavan deposition) at pp. 67-68.
Jack's testimony, that his father Oliver had entered into a handshake deal to allow the
District's predecessor to permissively maintain a boat launch on Delavan property, was confirmed
through the trial testimony of Pat Seale. Seale purchased Lots 17 and 18 in 1982 and 1983. Tr., Vol.
I, pp. 446-4 7. Seale personally observed Oliver performing physical work on the boat ramp shortly
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after Seale purchased his property. Id. at pp. 448-49.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And you [Seale] saw him [Oliver], as you described, clearing away debris and
driftwood, etc.?
Yes.
And so you asked him why he was doing that?
Yes.
And what did he tell you why he was doing what you have just described?
He said that that was his property and that he was responsible for it. And I
was surprised, so I said, "I thought it was the County's." And he said, "No,
it was his but he lets the County use it."

Id. at pp. 453-54. Jack, who succeeded to Oliver's interests, confirmed that he too allowed the
public to permissively use the boat launch and the disputed triangle. Tr. Ex. EEEE at p. 71.

7.

Oliver Delavan's Installation of the Fence.

In January of 1955, the Coeur d'Alene Press reported on the installation of the boat launch.
Tr. Ex. 6. The photographs which accompanied the article do not show a fence on the Delavan side
of the boat launch. Id. This is consistent with the testimony of Jack that his father Oliver constructed
a fence along the Delavan side of the boat launch, after the launch was constructed, to serve as a
barrier to keep people off of the remainder of the Delavan property. Jack testified:
"[T]he reason my father (Oliver] built the fence there was kids swimming and what
not, people pretty soon were slopping over on his dock, and he didn't want them on
there because if something happens, while all at once he's in trouble, so that's why
the fence was put up."
Tr. Ex. EEEE (Jack Delavan deposition) at pp. 32-33 and Depo. Ex. I.
In 1956, Ray Kindler completed an unrecorded Survey of Parcels in Lakeshore Addition,
including portions of the property claimed by the District and portions of the Delavan property. Tr.
Ex. 9. Kindler's Survey Notes said: "Fence along the entire length" of the Delavan property south
of the boat launch. Id. Kindler's Survey, coupled with Jack's testimony and the 1955 Coeur d'Alene
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Press article (Tr. Ex. 6), support the finding that the fence on the south side of the boat launch was
constructed by Oliver, after the boat launch was put in, as a barrier (and not a boundary).

8.

The Kindler Survey.

On August 21, 1956, the Coeur d'Alene Highway District, at a meeting of Commissioners,
"agreed to straighten out all the property lines of Boothe Park." That District then engaged surveyor
Ray Kindler for purposes of documenting conditions on the ground. Kindler prepared a Survey
which depicted a line between "Boothe Park" (a portion of the unplatted area between Lots 18 and
19 and the Delavan property) that was consistent with the fence line ("this line has fence along the
entire length"). Tr. Ex. 9. Yet the testimony is unrebutted that the purpose of the fence was not as
a boundary but rather as a barrier. The Appellant neither offered any evidence from anyone as to the
purpose of the fence, nor did it rebut Jack's testimony based on his personal knowledge.
There is no evidence that Oliver ever spoke to Kindler, that Oliver ever saw Kindler's
Survey, or that Oliver ever acknowledged or agreed to Kindler's Survey. An unsigned cover letter
of Kindler's transmittal of the Survey (dated October 5, 1956), states, "In order not to cause any
trouble with the adjacent property owners, Walker, Delavan and Wiks, we followed [multiple] old
fence lines as closely as possible .... " Tr. Ex. 11. While Kindler's legal description of the property
Boothe deeded to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District was identified "as agreed upon by all of the
adjacent landowners," there is no evidence that Oliver Delavan made any acknowledgment or
concession, written or otherwise, that the fence he constructed was to serve as a boundary as
opposed to a barrier. Tr. Ex. 11. In fact, based upon the evidence, it is clear that Oliver did not agree
that the fence line depicted by Kindler constituted a boundary. The unrebutted evidence introduced
at trial included the following:
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•

Oliver purchased four (4) lots which everyone agrees were supposed to be
one hundred (I 00) feet in width.

•

To the extent that Oliver's Lot 19 did not include one hundred (100) feet of
width, Boothe attempted "reparative" action through his 1949 Quit Claim
Deed to Oliver.

•

Oliver's Lot 19 is only one hundred (100) feet wide ifit includes the 34.20
feet of frontage included within the disputed triangle (which includes the boat
launch). This is consistent with the boundary as determined by the District
Court's Judgment.

•

Jack testified that his father Oliver permissively allowed the Coeur d'Alene
Highway District to put the boat launch on Oliver's property.

•

Jack testified that his father Oliver put the fence in after the boat launch was
constructed to serve as a barrier to keep the public off of the remainder of
Oliver's property.

•

Oliver told Pat Seale, twenty-seven (27) years after the Kindler Survey, that
he (Oliver) owned the boat launch and allowed the public to use it.

•

Why would Oliver put a fence as a barrier in 1955 and then acknowledge that
the fence was a boundary one year later, in 1956?

There was no evidence offered by the District that Oliver ever saw the Kindler Survey (since it
wasn't recorded), that the Kindler Survey was ever distributed to Oliver, or that Oliver ever saw the
resulting legal description Kindler provided to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District.

9.

The Coeur d'Alene Highway District is Dissolved.

The Coeur d'Alene Highway District, which acquired title in 1955 to whatever remained in
the unplatted area between Lots 18 and 19 after the 1949 conveyance from Boothe to Oliver, was
dissolved by order of the Kootenai County Commissioners effective May 15, 1971. Tr. Ex. N. The
Board of Commissioners entered a specific Order which required that the Coeur d'Alene Highway
District's title to any and all real property "shall" be transferred to the Kootenai County Board of
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Commissioners by recordable deed no later than May 19, 1971." Id. (emphasis added).
The evidence at trial established that there never was a deed, either executed or recorded, to
transfer title from the Coeur d'Alene Highway District to Kootenai County or to the East Side
Highway District. Mike McDowell, County Assessor, testified that through 1996, the records of
Kootenai County showed that the ownership of whatever property the District now claims (as an
alleged successor-in-interest to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District) stood of record as "unknown
owner." At some point in time, some unknown person employed by the County made a
determination to simply change the assessment records, without a deed of conveyance, to now show
that the East Side Highway District owns whatever the Coeur d'Alene Highway District owned
between Lots 18 and 19. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 220-21.
In actuality, during the twenty-five (25) years following the Coeur d'Alene Highway
District's 1971 dissolution, Kootenai County acknowledged that the Delavans owned the disputed
triangle (including the boat launch). Tr. Ex. Q. ("Thirty-four (34) feet of [Delavan] lake frontage
is occupied by the boat ramp which belongs to [Delavan].").

10.

1977 Department of Lands Encroachment Permit to
Kootenai County.

In 1977, Kootenai County (not the East Side Highway District) made application to the Idaho
Department of Lands ("IDL") to extend the concrete boat ramp. Tr. Ex. M. At trial, Jim Brady,
Senior Navigable Water Specialist for IDL, authenticated Kootenai County's 1977 Application. Tr.,
Vol. I, pp. 146-48. The 1977 submittals by Kootenai County confirmed that the boat launch was on
the Delavan property. Id. Brady hand-wrote on Exhibit M the actual boundary as shown on the
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original submittal made by Kootenai County, and he initialed the same. Ex. M, p. 3. 12

11.

Proceedings Before the Kootenai County Board of
Equalization.

In 1992, after Oliver had passed away, Jack succeeded to the Delavan property. Jack appealed
his assessment valuation for Lots 19, 20, and 21. Tr. Ex. 18. Jack advised Kootenai County that he
was being assessed for three hundred (300) front feet (consistent with three (3) one hundred (100)
feet wide lots), but that he should only be assessed for two hundred sixty-six (266) feet because of
the limited utility of the boat launch. Id. In response, the Assessor recommended a valuation
amendment that would put thirty-four (34) feet of the Delavan property into the "right-of-way
category," given the location of the boat launch on the Delavan property. Id. The Assessor's internal
notes stated:
The survey information, as substantiated by the appraisal photo, depicts the area
occupied by the Boothe Park access road and boat ramp encroaching within Lot 19
as owned by the Delavans. It would seem appropriate to amend the 1992 assessment
records for the subject parcel to reflect an amended accessible frontage of 167.84
front feet [as to Lots 19 and 20] and to additionally include a category ... (34.16
front feet) [sic] to reflect that portion of Lot 19 occupied by the Boothe Park Road
and ramp.

The issue again resurfaced in 199 5, after Greg had succeeded to title to Lots 19 and 20. Greg
filed his own appeal from the valuation for Lots 19 and 20 due to the fact that thirty-four (34) feet
of Lot 19 was occupied by the boat launch. Tr. Ex. Q. Following an appeal, the Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners, sitting as the Board of Equalization, entered an Order which contained the
following Finding of Fact:

12

A copy of page 3 of Exhibit Mis included for the Court's convenience at Appendix J.
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The Appellant [Greg Delavan] stated the subject property is located adjacent to
Boothe Park which is a public access to Lake Coeur d'Alene. Thirty-four (34) feet
oflake frontage is occupied by the boat ramp which belongs to the Appellant [Greg
Delavan] ....

12.

Subsequent Developments with Kootenai County and the
District.

In December of2003, Greg met with representatives of the District. According to the District,
Greg stated that "[t]here has never been a question in his mind that he didn't own the boat launch
area." Id. Bruce Anderson, a Kootenai County surveyor, acknowledged that no deed to any portion
of property between Lots 18 and 19 had ever been executed by the Coeur d'Alene Highway District
for the benefit of the East Side Highway District. Id. at p. 3. Anderson simply concluded that the
unrecorded Kindler Survey controlled, even though a survey is not an instrument of conveyance. Id.
The District told Greg that it would be his "responsibility to prove to the District that the actual boat
launch area belonged to him." Id.
In 2007, Kootenai County proposed to charge fees for the use of the boat launch. Tr. Ex. 26.
Greg objected to the County's plan:
We ... object to charging for use ofDelavan's Marina ramp facilities. It certainly
would be inappropriate to charge fees to the friends and family of the property
owners and those customers ofDelavan's Marina who moor their boats with us. This
privilege has been "free to the public" since my grandfather and father agreed to the
joint venture development of Boothe Park over fifty (50) years ago. Our preference
is to keep the boat ramp "free of charge" to the boating public, especially for military
veterans and the residents of Kootenai County. The only commercial use ofour ramp
shall be limited to scope and allowed only by agreement with Delavan's Marina.

We have been told that Delavan's Marina is now the only friendly non-developerowned marina on the north end of Lake Coeur d'Alene. We have no intention of
selling our property and we intend to continue [to] provide friendly access to Lake
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Coeur d'Alene for the good citizens of Kootenai County for as long as we are able
to.
Tr. Ex. 26.
On July 13, 2009, the District physically posted Greg's fence, and the retaining wall upon
which the fence had been reconstructed, as an alleged encroachment within the District's right-ofway. Tr. Ex. 30. The District did so even though all evidence relied upon by the District (including
the Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside Plat and the Kindler Survey) showed South Boothe Park Road
as stopping short of the lakeshore and even though Oliver had installed a fence as a barrier (not a
boundary) some fifty-four (54) years earlier. The Delavans responded on July 22, 2009, disputing
the claim that they had improperly placed any encroachments within the District's alleged right-ofway. Tr. Ex. UU. This lawsuit followed.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
The issues as framed by Appellant are as follows:
I.

DID THE DISTRJCT COURT ERR IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
1949 DEED FROM THE SOOTHES TO OLIVER DELAVAN AND EDNA
DELAVAN?

2.

DID THE DISTRJCT COURT ERR IN HOLDING THERE WAS NO
BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DISTRICT'S
PREDECESSOR AND THE DELAVANS' PREDECESSORS?

3.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN HOLDING LC. § 40-202(3) DID
NOT APPLY?

4.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN THE DECREE IT ENTERED?

Respondent submits the following additional issues on appeal:
5.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS
THE DISTRICT'S CLAIMS DUE TO THE DISTRICT'S FAILURE TO
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ESTABLISH AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE?
6.

III.

WHETHER RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO l.C. § 12-121?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
A.

Findings by the Trial Court.

The governing standard of review was summarized by this Court as follows:
On appeal, this Court will not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. IRCP 52(a). Appellate review of the decision of the trial court is limited
to ascertaining whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions oflaw. Crea v. Crea, 135
Idaho 246, 16 P.3d 922 (2000); Baxter v. Craney. 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000).
When an action is tried to a court without a jury, determinations as to the credibility
of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, its probative effect and
inferences and conclusions to be drawn there from, are all matters within the
province of the trial court. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738,
9 P.3d 1204 (2000). The trial court's findings of fact will be liberally construed in
favor of the judgment entered. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 23 P-.3d 147 (2001).
This Court exercises free review over conclusions oflaw. Smith v. J. V. Parson Co.,
127 Idaho 937,941,908 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1996).
Estate ofSkvorak v. Security Union, 140 Idaho 16, 19, 89 P.3d 856 (2004).

B.

Summary Judgment.

The District Court's Judgment was predicated in part upon its determination on partial
summary judgment that the District could state no claim under l.C. § 40-202(3). The governing
standard of review in this regard is as follows:
On appeal from an order granting a party's motion for summary judgment, this Court
employs the same standard of review that the trial court uses in ruling on the motion.
Banner Life Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixon Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117,
123, 206 P.3d 481, 487 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents before the court indicate that no
genuine issues of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Banner Life Insurance Co., 147
Idaho at 123, 206 P.3d at 487. The moving party carries the burden of proving the
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absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,222,220 P.3d 575 (2009). When an action is tried before a court
without a jury, the court may, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, draw the most
probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary facts. Id.

C.

Interpretation of a Deed.

In Baker v. Kai, LLC, 163 Idaho 530,415 P.3d 939 (2018), this Court held:
When reviewing a district court's interpretation of a deed, the standard of review
"depends on whether the instrument is ambiguous." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho
763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001 ). Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question oflaw,
over which we exercise free review. Id. "Interpretation of an ambiguous document
presents a question of fact, and we will defer to the findings of the trial court so long
as those findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id.
However, interpretation of an unambiguous document is a question of law and a
matter of free review. Id.
Id. (quoting Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 8, 293 P.3d 630, 632
(2012)).

IV.

ARGUMENT.
A.

The District Court Did Not Fail to Address a Gap in the Chain of Title.

On appeal, for the first time, the District asserts error on the basis that Greg's evidence at trial
"failed to show" that he owned the property Boothe deeded to Oliver. 13 The District's argument is
baseless. In its Complaint, the District alleged that Greg owned the property in dispute. R., Vol. I,
pp. 14-16

(iliJ 2,

11, 18, 22). At trial, Greg testified that Jack and his brother Frank succeeded to

Oliver's estate. Tr., Vol. I, p. 494. Jack subsequently conveyed to Greg the property that Oliver had

13

This Court will not, as a general rule, consider issues that are raised for the first time on
appeal." Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604,612,364 P.3d 951,959 (2015) (citation omitted).
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acquired from Boothe. Tr. Ex. 20. 14 The same property was subsequently conveyed by Jack to Greg
yet again, in 2014. The District's argument is simply an unsupported claim, with no citation to any
supporting authority, and was advanced for the first time on appeal.

B.

The District Court Did Not Err in Its Interpretation of the 1949 Deed
from Boothe to Oliver.
1.

Legal Standard Applicable to Deed Interpretation.

The standards applicable to the interpretation of the deeds are as follows. In Neider v. Shaw,
138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525 (2003):
When construing an instrument that conveys an interest in land, Courts seek to give
effect to the intent of the parties to the transaction. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway
District, 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000) (citing Gardner v. Fligel, 92
Idaho 767,770,450 P.2d 990, 993 (1969)). The intent of the parties is determined by
viewing the conveyance instrument as a whole. Id. (citing Doyle v. Ortega, 125 Idaho
458,461, 872 P.2d 721, 724 (1994)). Interpretation of an unambiguous conveyance
instrument is a question of law to be settled by plain language. City of Kellogg v.
Mission Mtn. Interests. Ltd. Co., 135 Idaho 239,243, 16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000).
Interpretation of an ambiguous deed is a question of fact to be settled by the language
in the conveyance instrument and the facts and circumstances of the transaction. Id.
Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law. Id. at 244, 16 P.3d at 920.
Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530.

2.

The District Court Did Not Err in Its Interpretation of the
1949 Deed from Boothe to Oliver.

In the 1949 reparative deed from Boothe to Oliver, Boothe conveyed the following-described
property:

"On appeal, the District intimates some impropriety in the deed by which Jack conveyed to
Greg the property that Oliver was deeded from Boothe. The deed was notarized and dated by the
notary on January 10, 1995, but the "dated" blank for the grantors reads December 30, 1997. The
notary, Mary Hopkins, was employed as Greg's assistant. Tr., Vol. I, p. 510. Mary notarized the deed
on January I 0, 1995. Id. at p. 511. The deed was not recorded until December 30, I 997. Id. The
"date" line had been left blank, and, on the day before the deed was recorded, Greg's mother, as
grantor, filled in that date. Id.
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Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 19, as originally platted, Lakeshore
Addition to Sunnyside, Section 33, Township 50 North, Range 3 West B.M., thence
North 79°58' East to the West boundary of the existing County road; thence along
the existing right-of-way line of said County road to its intersection with the meander
line of Lake Coeur d'Alene; thence Southerly along the meander line of said Lake
Coeur d'Alene, to the point of beginning, said land being in the County of Kootenai,
State ofldaho.
Id. The "key call" in this deed is the "boundary of the existing county road" as of August 17, 1949,
the date of the conveyance.
The deed's description begins at the northwest corner of Lot 19 as originally platted. The
legal description then continues eastward to the west "boundary of the existing county road." Then
the description backtracks along "the existing right-of-way line of said county road to its intersection
with the meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene." Tr. Exs. D; 3. The reparative deed is an attempt to
encompass all property between Lot 19 as platted and the road as it existed in August of 1949. There
was no evidence offered by the District as to the actual location of the County road (South Boothe
Park Road) in August of 1949. Without proof of the location of South Boothe Park Road as of
August of 1949, the deed has a latent ambiguity.
Before a court determines that an otherwise unambiguous deed contains a latent
ambiguity because a monument described in the deed is currently missing, it must
first determine whether the evidence establishes that the monument, though missing,
previously existed at the location described by the deed.
11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 21.This Court has acknowledged that, under Idaho law, "physical
features existing on the ground and referred to in the deed must be considered when construing that
deed." Akers v. D. L. White Construction Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 299-300, 1297 P.3d 196, 202-203
(2005).
The District Court found, in part, as follows:
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6.

John Boothe ... conveyed additional unplatted property lying between Lots
18 and 19 as platted to Oliver Delavan in 1949. This property was described
in the deed as being bounded to the northeast and northwest by Boothe Park
Road as it existed in 1949, along the road, and then along the right-of-way
line of Boothe Park Road to the meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene.

7.

Based on the evidence presented, the Court infers that the deed from Boothe
to Delavan was intended to be reparative of the numbering problem [in the
plat] and grant Delavan the amount of lake frontage for which he owned by
title. The conveyance of the unplatted lot was intended to provide a hundred
feet of lake frontage.

8.

Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949 did not reach the meander line of
Lake Coeur d'Alene, and did not continue past Oliver Delavan's driveway.

9.

The precise course of the road nears its terminus as it existed in 1949 is
indeterminable. The majority of Boothe Park today is a wide parking lot for
the park and boat ramp. Thus, the precise course of Boothe Park's projected
right-of-way line to Lake Coeur d'Alene in I 949 cannot be determined.

10.

In 1949, there was no boat ramp in existence at the end of Boothe Park road,
and thus no reason for the road to continue to the Lake.

See "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Verdict," entered June 20,2017 (Appendix G). The
District Court properly held, due to an absence of proof as to the location of a physical feature called
out some sixty-five (65) years before trial, that the deed from Boothe to Oliver was ambiguous.
Given this finding, the Court was, by necessity, charged with determining, as a matter of fact, the
nature, extent, and location of the property conveyed by Boothe to Oliver in 1949. In so doing, the
court was empowered "to give effect to the intent of the parties to the transaction." Daugharty v. Post
Falls Highway District, 134 Idaho at 735, 9 P.3d at 538.
The evidence before the District Court included the following:
•

The only witness with personal knowledge as to the location of South Boothe
Park Road in 1949 was Jack Delavan.
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•

The District, in its Opening Brief, concedes that its expert, Geremy Russell,
"testified he does not know where the County road existed in 1949." See
Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 13. The District further acknowledged that
Greg's expert, Ernest Warner, PLS, "testified he did not know where the
existing County road was located in 1949." Id. All parties (including
Russell, Warner, and Jack) acknowledged that South Boothe Park Road
terminated short of the water. Tr., Vol. I, p. 388.

•

Jack testified that "Boothe Park Road never went past the corner of our
property," i.e., the Delavan driveway. Tr. Ex. EEEE (Jack Delavan
deposition) at pp. 56, 58.

•

Kindler, in his 1956 Survey, showed no extension of South Boothe Park
Road beyond the Delavan driveway or the entry into Boothe Park. Tr. Ex. 9.
Russell acknowledged that, under these circumstances, with no extension of
South Boothe Park Road to the meander line, that the right-of-way of South
Boothe Park Road, as of 1949, would need to be prolongated to its
intersection with the meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene. Tr., Vol. I, pp.
390-91.

•

A prolongation of the right-of-way of South Boothe Park Road (as shown on
the Kindler Survey) is depicted on Ex. DDDD. 15

•

By prolongating the right-of-way of South Boothe Park Road from its
terminus in 1949 (according to Jack Delavan's testimony) and 1956
(according to Kindler's Survey), the boat launch is squarely within the
northwest corner of Greg's property, making Greg's property the required one
hundred (100) feet in width. Id.

•

This Court is asked to compare Exhibit DDDD (Appendix K), which shows
the prolongation, with Exhibit CCCC (Appendix I), which shows the
disputed triangle (with a base of 34.20 feet). The Assessor unilaterally
removed the disputed triangle from Greg's title, transferring the same to the
East Side Highway District. A comparison of Exhibit CCCC (Appendix I)
and Exhibit DDDD (Appendix K) shows that the boat launch is squarely
located within the prolongated right-of-way of South Boothe Park Road.

Simply put, the trial court properly weighed the evidence at trial, and considered the parties'
intentions with respect to a conveyance with a latent ambiguity, and made a finding of fact supported
15

A copy of Exhibit DDDD is included as Appendix K, with yellow highlighting shown on
the prolongation.
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by substantial evidence. On appeal, the District simply seeks to reargue the weight of the evidence.
Even Russell agreed that the 1949 conveyance from Boothe to Oliver, which Russell called "a
corrective action," was intended to rectify the numbering issue in the Plat, leaving Oliver with three
hundred (300) feet of property (three (3) one hundred (I 00) foot wide lots), which was what Oliver
thought he had purchased. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 378-79. 16

3.

The District's Evidentiary Objection Is Immaterial.

The District Court found that "Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949 did not reach the
meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene, and did not continue past Oliver Delavan's driveway." See
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Verdict," entered June 20, 2017 at Finding H (Appendix
G). On appeal, the District argues that this Finding was unsupported by substantial evidence. The
District cites the testimony of Greg Delavan, to which the District objected at trial. Tr., Vol. I, pp.
497-502.
Specifically, the District argues that since Greg was born in 1953, he had no personal
knowledge of the location of South Boothe Park Road in 1949, or whether it extended past the
Delavan driveway. The District does not note, nor does it discuss, the separate testimony received
from Jack Delavan, the only witness with personal knowledge of the location and appearance of
South Boothe Park Road and the Delavan driveway in 1949.

16

On appeal, the District argues, "The District Court does not identify the evidence upon
which it relied in drawing its inference that by deeding a parcel to Oliver ... four years after their
purchase from Wasmer, that the Boothes intended Oliver ... would acquire 100 feet oflake frontage
to match their expectation arising under the Wasmer deed." See Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 33.
In point of fact, it was the District's own witness, Mr. Russell, who characterized the Boothe to
Oliver deed as a corrective action: "It was something to say, you were intended to get that, but you
didn't get it. So we're going to - - - Mr. Boothe - - - again, compelled by reasons we don't know - - give them that piece." Tr., Vol. I, pp. 378-79.
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The following colloquy between Jack and the District's counsel is telling:

Q.

So, I've highlighted two things on this [deposition] exhibit 5 for you. One is
the boat ramp, and one is a notation that says "existing road."

Q.

Okay. Also on this diagram it shows an existing access public road going
down to that dock. Is that similar to how that existed at the time the [boat]
ramp was put in?
That road didn't go down to that ramp at all.
Okay. Where did the road end?
The - - - well, it ended up - - - turned and come this way (indicating) and it
went that way through a gate down there.
Down by the park?
Yeah.
Did it go by your driveway as it does today?
No.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Tr. Ex. EEEE (Jack Delavan deposition) at pp. 53-54 (emphasis added). When asked subsequently
about a claimed extension of Boothe Park Road past his driveway to the boat launch, Jack again
stated, "The road never did go down to the Lake there." Id. at p. 56.
In determining whether or not the Boothe to Oliver deed included a latent ambiguity, the
Court was required, by necessity, to examine the physical reference points described therein. Those
reference points were as of August of 1949. The only evidence from any witness with personal
knowledge as to the terminus of South Boothe Park Road, in August of 1949, was Jack. This
testimony was received without objection. 17
A comparison of Exhibit DDDD (Appendix K) and Exhibit CCCC (Appendix I), both of
which proceed with a prolongated right-of-way towards the meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene,
consistent with Russell's suggested methodology, are entirely consistent with the terms of the

17

Post-trial, the District Court further noted the District had "preserved no objection at the
time of [Jack Delavan's] deposition," and that the District's subsequent written objections were
overruled. R. Vol. III, pp. 623-24.
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Court's Second Amended Judgment. The Court's decision in this regard is supported by substantial
and competent evidence, weighed by the trial court as the finder of fact. The District simply seeks
to reargue the same by selectively citing the record.
C.

The District Court Did Not Err in Finding there Was No Boundary by
Agreement.

I.

The Legal Standard.

The District has set forth the applicable legal standard for resolving a claim of boundary by
agreement. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503,506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003). In short, boundary
by agreement requires: "(I) An uncertain or disputed boundary involving adjacent properties, and
(2) an agreement fixing the boundary." Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 495, 50 P.3d 987, 990
(2002). The elements of boundary by agreement must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,860,230 P.3d 743, 752 (2010).
2.

The District Court Did Not Err in Holding There Was No
Boundary by Agreement.

The doctrine of boundary by agreement requires more than an uncertain or disputed
boundary. It requires an agreement (expressed or implied) that the dispute be settled through a
consensual boundary, for example, one demarked by a fence. "Where a fence is alleged to establish
a boundary by agreement, and there is no evidence regarding who built the fence or why they built
it, the fact that the fence has been in existence for a number of years strongly suggests it was put in
place as a boundary by agreement." Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho at 495, 50 P.3d at 990.
In essence, the law imposes an agreement, as a legal fiction, when a boundary has long been
disputed or uncertain and a long-standing fence exists for which no other rationale can be given.
Such are not the facts at bar.
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The evidence introduced at trial included the following:
•

Oliver acquired three (3) adjacent lots, each platted with a width of one
hundred (100) feet.

•

When the error in the Plat became apparent, resulting in Lot 20 shifting north
where Lot 19 was platted and Lot 19 shifting north into the unplatted area
retained by Boothe, Boothe executed a corrective or reparative deed to
Oliver.

•

The boat launch is located in the northwest comer of Lot 19, as shifted
northward from platted Lot 19 (now Lot 20).

Jack Delavan, the only witness with personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances as
they existed between 1949 and 1956, testified as follows:
•

His father, Oliver, knew the boat launch to be his property. Tr. Ex. EEEE
(Jack Delavan deposition) at p. 66.

•

His father Oliver agreed to allow the boat launch to be permissively placed
on property he (Oliver) "knew was his property." Id. at p. 68.

•

Jack was living on the property when the boat launch was constructed. Id. at
p. 21.

•

Following construction of the boat launch, Oliver constructed a fence on the
south side of the launch to keep kids and members of the public off of the
remainder of his property. Id. at pp. 32-33.

Nearly thirty (30) years later, Oliver was still claiming title to the boat launch, telling his neighbor,
Pat Seale, that he (Oliver) was responsible for the boat launch, that the launch belonged to him, and
that he let the County use it. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 453-54.
The implication of an agreement to fix a boundary does not apply where, as here, there is
"evidence regarding who built the fence'' and "why they built it." Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho at 495,
50 P.3d at 990. There was no uncertainty on the part of Oliver as to his boundary. There is no
evidence that he constructed a fence for the purpose of establishing a boundary. He constructed a
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fence to serve as a barrier. The fence had nothing to do with fixing a boundary.

In Boyd-Davis v. Baker, 157 Idaho 688, 339 P.3d 749 (2014), the Court addressed yet
another claim of boundary by agreement. Evidence was introduced that the fence was constructed
for the purpose of containing horses, and not for the purpose of demarking a boundary. Employing
a "clear and convincing" standard, the trial court held that the plaintiff had not proven the elements
of boundary by agreement given evidence that the original fence was never intended to serve as a
botmdary. That decision was affirmed by this Court as being "supported by substantial and
competent evidence." The result in Boyd-Davis v. Baker, supra, is analogous to the result at trial in
this proceeding: "The fence described [in this action] did not constitute a boundary between the
Delavan property and Plaintiff's property." R., Vol. III. p. 768.
The District argues that its predecessor, the Coeur d'Alene Highway District, was uncertain
about its boundary in 1956. The District argues that based upon this uncertainty, as well as
uncertainties with boundaries as to other neighboring properties, the District engaged surveyor Ray
Kindler. This is all well and good, but it does not mean that Oliver Delavan was unclear as to the
location of his boundary. In fact, all evidence indicates that Oliver always believed the boat launch
to be on his property. What the District really argues is that its predecessor, claiming uncertainty as
to its boundary, wished to expand its property to a fence constructed by a neighbor for the sole
purpose of keeping people off of his property (as opposed to demarking the boundary). The trial
court properly held that the District's position was not supported by the evidence, whether under a
clear and convincing standard or under a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Interestingly, if there was some intention to fix the boundary dispute in 1956 through Oliver's
construction of a chainlink fence on his side of the boat launch, it would have come as a surprise not
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only to Oliver, but to his son Jack and to his grandson Greg. So too would it have come as a surprise
to Kootenai County. Kootenai County assessed Jack, during his period of ownership, for the disputed
triangle with its 34.20 feet of frontage. Jack challenged his assessment, arguing that the permissivelylocated boat launch should not be assessed as otherwise developable waterfront. Tr. Ex. 18.
Kootenai County agreed, deciding to reclassify the disputed triangle, still under Delavan's
ownership, as "right-of-way." Id. The same result occurred when Greg acquired ownership, and
appealed his assessment. Tr. Ex. Q. The County entered an Order with a "Finding of Fact" that Greg
owned the disputed triangle (some thirty (30) years after the date the District claims an implied
boundary agreement was reached).
The District suggests that the trial court erred by admitting Jack's testimony as to the
intention and purpose of Oliver's fence.

The procedural facts belie the District's claim. The

deposition of Jack Delavan was admitted as trial Exhibit EEEE by stipulation. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 54951. The District made written objections to portions of the transcript. R., Vol. II, pp. 575-76. The
trial court subsequently overruled any objection to the cited portion of Jack's deposition testimony
(pages 32-33). R., Vol. III, pp. 623-24. The Court further noted that the District had "preserved no
objections at the time of deposition," and for that additional basis, the District's objection was
overruled. 18

"Even if the District preserved an objection of merit as to Jack's testimony at pages 32-33
of his deposition, and even if the District Court abused its discretion in admitting said testimony,
there is still independent evidence in the record supporting the District Court's factual finding that
Oliver's fence was never intended to be a boundary. Oliver's neighbor, Pat Seale, testified that
Oliver specifically told him, nearly thirty (30) years after the fence was constructed, that he (Oliver)
owned the boat launch, belying any implied agreement that his fence constituted a boundary.
Contrary to the District's objections, the District Court, on the record, stated that it was, "in its
discretion," going to allow Seale's testimony pursuant to IRE 803(1), as a present sense impression
made "while the Declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter." Tr.,
35

The remaining arguments advanced by the District should be rejected. For example, the
District asserts that the deed under which Greg first acquired title acknowledges a prior "boundary
by agreement." In particular, the District argues that Greg acquired 65.8 feet of frontage north of
platted Lot 19, rather than one hundred (I 00) feet. Tr. Ex. 19 (Appendix A). In actuality, Greg
testified that his original deed from Jack did not include the 34.20 feet of the boat launch because
he "needed to get a loan to purchase the property from the bank and [he] needed a title policy to do
that. And I didn't want any contested property that I owned to be included in that. So we drew the
legal descriptions to include the uncontested property so it could go through the title company and
get the loan." Tr., Vol. I, p. 545-46. Greg separately acquired title to the remaining Delavan
property (34.20 feet) lying north of the 65.8 feet he acquired from Jack. Tr. Ex. 20.
The District further argues that Jack somehow acknowledged a boundary by agreement with
the District through a I 992 submittal to the Idaho Department of Lands seeking an amendment to
his marina encroachment permit. Tr. Ex. 17. The District claims that Jack drew the marina plan and
provided it to his architect, Bill Dahlberg. The plan identifies the boat launch as "public." Based
upon the testimony of Jim Brady, IDL considered the boat launch to be the property of the Delavans.
Otherwise, the Delavans would not have satisfied the required twenty-five (25) foot setback to
maintain their commercial encroachment permit. Tr., Vol. I, pp. !54-55. 19

Vol. I, p. 453.
19

This is consistent with materials on file with IDL consisting of Kootenai County's
Encroachment Permit Application from 1977, which identifies the boat launch as being on the
Delavan side of the parties' common property boundary. Tr. Ex. J (Appendix M).
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D.

The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of
Delavan on the District's Claim Under I.C. § 40-202(3).

LC. § 40-202(3) provides that, "All highways used for a period of five (5) years, provided
they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public ... are highways." The District
argued that the boat launch located on the disputed triangle constituted a "highway" within the
statutory definition contained in LC.§ 40-109(5).
The District Court made a specific finding of fact, in the context of the District's claim of
boundary by agreement, that the"[ u ]se of the boat launch by all parties other than defendants or their
predecessors-in-interest, since its construction, has been permissive." R., Vol. III, p. 768. Based on
this finding, Greg moved for partial summary judgment on the District's claim under§ 40-202(3),
arguing that permissive use could not ripen into a prescriptive claim under the statute. The District
Court agreed. The District Court's decision is reviewed by this Court on appeal under the same
standards used by the District Court. The District Court did not err as a matter of law. The District
Court's decision finds support in two (2) cases previously determined by this Court.
First, in Lattin v. Adams County. 149 Idaho 497,503,236 P.3d 1257, 1263 (2010), this Court
inferentially held that a property owner who permissively allows the public access to a portion of his
property did not equate to adverse use sufficient to invoke§ 40-202(3 ). As held by the District Court,
in Lattin, this Court "requires that the use [alleged under§ 40-202(3 )] must be hostile and not by way
of permission for the government to obtain a highway by prescription over private land." R., Vol.

III, p. 858.
Second, to hold otherwise, and to allow for a prescriptive claim through permissive use,
would run afoul of constitutional protections. In Ada County Highway District v. Total Success
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Investments, LLC, 135 Idaho 360, 369, I79 P.3d 323, 332 (2008), this Court held:
We hold § 40-202 is not unconstitutional on its face. If a landowner believes the
acquisition of a roadway pursuant to § 40-202 results in a taking, the landowner has
four years from the approval of the cause of action to bring a claim of inverse
condemnation.
(Emphasis added). There is no disputed issue of fact that at all points in time, the Delavans had
consistently maintained ownership of the boat launch and public use of the same was by permission.
The District Court specifically found, as a matter of fact, at the conclusion of phase one of trial, that
the Delavans had permissively allowed the public to use their boat launch. To apply§ 40-202(3) to
these facts, and to allow the District to obtain a prescriptive claim, would be unconstitutional. At
no point in time were the Delavans on any notice so as to bring an inverse condemnation claim. The
Delavans policed, maintained, and oversaw the boat launch, all to the betterment of their community,
and they should not be held to have lost their ownership by facilitating permissive use.

E.

The District Court's Final Judgment is Proper.

On appeal, the District argues that the District Court erred in entering its Final Judgment,
because the Judgment awards the Delavans, in addition to title to the disputed triangle, an expanse
of land which is depicted in pink on Appendix B (which is an excerpt of the Court's Second
Amended Judgment). R., Vol. I, pp. 74-77. The District Court's Judgment is proper.
The District Court's Second Amended Judgment arose out of the second phase of trial, which
resulted in a judicial determination of the location of the parties' common boundary. That boundary
was based upon the legal description in the Boothe to Oliver deed. Tr. Exs. D; 3. Pursuant to the
relevant instrument, Boothe granted Oliver title to and along "the existing right-of-way line of said
county road," as it existed on August 17, 1949. Id. To the extent that the road stopped short of the
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Lake, as it did, the right-of-way line was prolongated to the meander line of the Lake.
As to the expanse of South Boothe Park Road lying east of the Delavan driveway and Boothe
Park proper, the road right-of-way was actually surveyed and made a part of the record. Russell, the
District's expert, acknowledged that Warner's exhibit (Appendix B) "has the same general theme,
the same harmonious relationship to that curvature" as South Boothe Park Road exists today. Tr.,
Vol. II, pp. 114-15. Russell testified that prior to the construction of the boat launch, in
approximately 1951, the location of the portion of South Boothe Park road abutting the pink parcel
(as shown on Appendix A) was consistent with the location where Warneroverlaid Booth Park Road
on the exhibit incorporated into the Second Amended Judgment. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 156-5 8. The District
Court's Second Amended Judgment, as reflected on Appendix B, was supported by substantial
evidence. The District simply seeks to reargue that evidence.

F.

The District Court Erred by Concluding that the District Had Standing
to Assert Its Claims.

The District brought suit, alleging that it was the successor-in-interest to the property Boothe
had conveyed to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District in 1955. R., Vol. I, pp. 14-17; Tr. Exs. E; 5.
The Coeur d'Alene Highway District was dissolved by order of the Kootenai County Commissioners
on May 15, 1971. Tr. Ex. N. The property held by the Coeur d'Alene Highway District, which forms
the basis for the Appellant's claims in this proceeding, was never deeded to the East Side Highway
District. The District Supervisor, John Pankratz, testified that he could find no deed of conveyance
to the subject property from the Coeur d'Alene Highway District to the East Side Highway District.
Tr., Vol. I, p. 438. The District's expert, Russell, also could not find an instrument of conveyance
from the Coeur d'Alene Highway District, whether to the East Side Highway District or anyone else.
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Id. at p. 410.
At the conclusion of the District's case, Greg moved for a directed verdict on the basis that
the District had failed to establish legally cognizable interest in the property Boothe conveyed to the
Coeur d'Alene Highway District. Id. at p. 439. The District Court denied the motion. Id. at p. 444.
The issue of standing was again raised by Greg in his post-trial briefing. R., Vol. Ill, pp. 69699. The issue was not addressed by the Court in its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Verdict" entered after phase one. Id. at pp. 767-69. The Court simply found, as a matter of fact, that
the East Side Highway District was "the successor-in-interest to the Coeur d'Alene Highway
District," without addressing the Appellant's failure of proof. Id. at p. 768.
While Greg did not cross-appeal on the standing issue, standing is jurisdictional, and can be
raised at any time, even sua sponte by the Court. See,~, Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Center,
LLC, 158 Idaho 957,354 P.3d 1172 (2015). 20

G.

Respondents Are Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.

The Delavans seek an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to J.C.§ 12-121. Attorney
fees may be awarded under the statute if the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation. Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). An award of attorney
fees on appeal is appropriate if the Appellant "simply invites the Appellate Court to second-guess
the trial court on conflicting evidence." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097
0

The District Court's ultimate findings, in favor of Greg, following phases one and two of
trial, were equally correct, and should be affirmed, on the standing issue. The standing issue is a
manifestation of the doctrine known as the "right result-wrong theory" rule. See,~, Idaho Schools
for Equal Education Opportunityv. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d, 724 (1992). In other words, the
Appellant had no standing to assert a claim to the property owned and claimed by Greg, and the
Judgment in favor of Greg is equally sustainable on the standing issue.
'
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(2006). The District's appeal, in primary part, simply asks this Court to second-guess the trial court
on conflicting evidence, and the Delavans are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on
appeal.

V.

CONCLUSION.
Respondents Greg and Ellen Delavan request that the District Court's Verdicts and Judgment

be affirmed in their entirety and that the Delavans be awarded their attorney fees and costs on
appeal.
DATED this ~

ofNovember, 201 8.
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ney for Respondents
Gregory K. Delavan and Ellen J . 0. Delavan
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Docket No. 45553-2017
EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the state of Idaho,
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GREGORY K. DELAVAN and ELLEN J. 0. DELAVAN, husband and wife,
Defendants/Cross-Claimants/Respondents.
INDEX OF APPENDIX TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
DESCRIPTION:

APPENDIX:
A

Trial Exhibit ZZ - Aerial Map of property.

B

Exhibit B to Second Amended Judgment Map of disputed triangle/area in dispute. R.,
Vol. II, pp. 61-64.

C

Trial Exhibit BBB - Photograph which
depicts Greg's son Jesse, in approximately
2007, in front of a "Private Entrance Slow"
sign, looking westward toward the Lake
from near the end of the chip-sealed portion
of South Boothe Park Road.

D

Trial Exhibit CCC - Photograph which
depicts Greg's daughter Michaela in the
same general vicinity. The photo was also
taken in approximately 2007. The "Private
Entrance" sign was installed by Greg's
grandfather, Oliver.
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APPENDIX:

DESCRIPTION:

E

Trial Exhibit 000 - A hand-written note by
Greg on Ex. 000 showing where the paved
portion of South Boothe Park Road ends
(labeled "chip seal" on the Exhibit). Greg
also circled two posts that were located
along the general line of a chainlink fence
previously installed by Oliver in the 1950s.

F

Trial Exhibit PPP - A more contemporary
photograph with the same general view as
Appendix F (looking eastward from the
terminus of the boat launch).

G

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Verdict dated June 20, 2017.

H

Trial Exhibit 8888 ( Rasor Survey with
Greg's initialed interlineation on page I).

I

Trial Exhibit CCCC.

J

Trial Exhibit M.

K

Trial Exhibit DDDD ("Greg's interlineation
on Meckel retracement of Kindler's Survey).
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STATE OF IOAHO
}
COUNTY OF KOOTCHAI SS
FILEO,

20ll JUN 20 AH II: OZ
CLEilK Ol5lRICI COURT
DEPUf?

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNT OF KOOTENAI

EASTSIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State ofldaho,

)

) CASE NO. CV-I2-3131
)
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
) OFLAW,ANDVERDICT
)
)

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
GREGORY K. DELA VAN and ELLEN J.O.
DELAVAN, husband and wife,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

)

)
)
)

-------------)
Susan P. Weeks, Attorney for Plaintiff
John F. Magnuson, Attorney for Defendants
Verdict for Defendants

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In 1910, the Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside Plat was recorded in Kootenai County.
That plat map reflected a roadway dedicated to the public forever; that roadway is now
South Boothe Park Road, which since 1956 has provided access to a boat launch on Lake
Coeur d'Alene.
2. John Boothe was one of the original landowners who subdivided the platted property.
3. The plat created 37 waterfront lots with a width of 100 feet each: lots 2- 38.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND VERDICT
1

APPENDIX G

4. Oliver Delavan, grandfather to Defendant Greg Delavan, acquired title to lots 19-22 as
platted in 1945 from Louis Wassmer, for a total of 400 feet of!ake frontage.
5. For an ·unknown reason, there was a problem with the lot numbering as shown on the plat

versus what was possessed on the ground, resulting in Oliver Delavan possessing 100
fewer feet oflake frontage than he possessed title to pursuant to the plat and his deeds.
6. John Boothe, one of the original parties who recorded the plat, conveyed additional
unplatted property lying between lots 18 and 19 as platted to Oliver Delavan in 1949.
This property was described in the deed as being bounded to the northeast and northwest
by Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949, along the road, and then along the right of
way line of Boothe Parke Road to the meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene.
7. Based on the evidence presented, the Court infers that the deed from Boothe to Delavan
was intended to be reparative of the numbering problem and grant Delavan the amount of
lake frontage for which he owned by title. The conveyance of the unplatted lot was
intended to provide 100 feet of lake frontage.
8. Boothe Parke Road as it existed in 1949 did not reaeh the meander line of Lake Coeur
d'Alene, and did not continue past Oliver Delavan', driveway.
9. The precise course of the road near its terminus as it existed in 1949 is indeterminable.
The majority of Boothe Park today is a wide parking area for the park and boat ramp.
Thus, the precise course of Boothe Park Road's projected right of way line to Lake Coeur
d'Alene in 1949 cannot be determined.
10. In 1949, there was no boat ramp in existence at the end of Boothe Park Road, and thus no
reason for the road to continue to the Lake.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND VERDICT
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11. In 1949, Boothe still owned the unplatted property which would later become Boothe
Park. This was private property with no public road at the location other than Boothe
Park Road as dedicated on the plat and/or as built.
12. On January 21, 1955, Boothe executed a quitclaim deed to the Coeur d'Alene Highway
District conveying property that lies north of the property conveyed to Oliver Delavan in
1949.
13. Plaintiff is the successor in interest to the Coeur d'Alene Highway District.
14. The 1910 plat map does not contain courses or distances of the roads it shows.
15. The 1910 plat map is not an entirely accurate representation of what exists on the grnund,
as it shows 200' of lake frontage between original lots 18 and 19 where only.168.38' of
frontage exists. The unplatted portion comprising Boothe Park and the boat launch was
measured by Rasor's 2001 survey as 102,58' including the 34.20' boat launch, and not
including Delavan's disputed property. With the additional 65.80' parcel of originally
unplatted property conveyed to Delevan, the frontage of the unplatted property is
approximately 168.38', not 200', Further, the pint map shows dedicated roads which
were never built, and the roads depicted on the plat map do not contain courses or

distances. Additionally, there was a discrepancy of 62 feet of shoreline between the 1910
plat and the G.L.O. survey conducted approximately twenty years earlier.
16.ln August of 1956, the Coeur d'Alene Highway District commissioned a survey by
County Surveyor Ray Kindler to "straighten out the property lines."
17, Kindler's survey shows Delavan's property boundary as being along a fence line
generally following Boothe Parke Road.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND VERDICT
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18. This fence line was intended to be a barrier, not a boundary.
19. Based on the evidence presented, the Court infers that Kindler placed concrete
monuments along this fence, and either assumed the fence was the boundary line or
attempted to 11straighten outu and alter the property lines in a manner harmonious to the

area landowners.
20. Kindler's survey is more of a wish list of what the property lines might be to achieve
harmonious relations with the area landowners; it did not establish the actual location of
the property lines.
21. The course of Boothe Park Road as it enters the park is substantially similar today as to
its course in 1949.
22. The course of Boothe Park Road in 1949 beyond the entry of what would later become
the park is indeterminable because the park parking lot, boat ramp, and improvements to
the road have occun·ed since 1955.
23. In approximately 2009, Greg Delavan constructed a retaining wall and fence near the
boat ramp.
24. Defendant posted an encroachment notice in this area and claimed it owned the property
where the retaining wall and fence were placed.
25. The Delavans historically maintained the boat ramp and claimed it as their own.
26. In 1992, Jack Delavan appealed his property tax assessment for being taxed for the boat
ramp area which, although on his property, served as an unrecorded right of way because
the public used the boat ramp. Kootenai County recognized Delavan's ownership and

adjusted its tax assessment in accordance with Delavan's claim.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
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II,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. "In a suit to quiet title, it is incumbent on plaintiff to establish that he has a title to be
quieted. He has tho affirmative of the issue and must prove his title by a preponderance of
evidence. He must succeed, if at all, on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness

of that of his adversary." Cell v, Drake, 61 Idaho 299, 100 P.2d 949,954 (1940).
2. "The burden of proof in a deelarat01y relief action is governed by the same rules and
considerations as are applicable to the same problem when it arises in legal proceedings
of other types." Alumel v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946,952,812 P.2d 253,259
(1991). The parties' claims are essentially quiet title claims and must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
3, Defendants did not file a Notice of Tort Claim in connection with their trespass cause of
action, and the Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.
4, Because the I 910 plat map does not contain courses or distances and has been shown to
be inaccurate, the Court finds that it is latently ambiguous as a matter of!aw.
5. Because the location of Boothe Park Road in 1949 after it enters the area of Boothe Park

is indeterminable, the deed from Boothe to Delavan in 1949 is latently ambiguous.
6. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, Boothe's intent in the deed conveying the
unplatted lot to Delavan in 1949 was reparative and intended to grant Delavan an
additional I00' of lake frontage to reflect his title ownership.
7. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the boundaries of this lot follow the current
course of Boothe Park Road to U1c point where it enters Boothe Park and then to the

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND VERDICT
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meander line of Lake Coeur d'Alene at a point such that the lot conveyed from Boothe to
Delevan in 1949 contains I 00' of lake frontage.
8. The retaining wall and fence are on Delavans' property.

9. Verdict is for the Defendants.

DATED this~ day of June, 2017.

LANSIN

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND VERDICT
6

istrict Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2IJ!:-day of June, 2017 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, faxed, sent by interoffice mail or hand-delivered to:
John F. Magnuson
PO Box2350
Coeur d'Alene, ID
83814
Fax: 667-0500

-IJS

Susan P. Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID
83814
Fax: 66.1-1684
.
/ J
.,U)VJV.f' c/iris-h ne€)1/ wreli .()

JIM BRANNON

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND VERDICT
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REOORD OF SURVEY
LOTS 21 AND:22, lAK£SHOR£ ADDfTION TO SUNNYSfDE:
lOCAT£D IN S£C. 33, T.50N., R.J'W.,
KOOTENAI COUNTY, fDAHO
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7 March 1977
Kootena 1 County
Kootenai County Courthouse
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
,.-·.

Attn: Mr. Bob Eachon
Dear Bob:

10.

·Enclosed 1s encroachment permit number ERL-95-5-672-A tor
replnee111ent of t~10 docks and construction of an extension to
tl1e concrete ramp at Booths Landinll as per the encroachment
application you filed on March 4, 1977,
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
BUREAU

or

N/IVJr,ADLf WATERS

/otc:..

KEITH J. KILF.R,
Strean, & Lakobed Spec! a11st
KJK:nh

Enc. (1)

cc: C-BNW
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE

Dato:

1l - l lo

-1'5

Deputy Clerk: -,--...t...:.'=>,_____
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.,
bf ATE BOARD OF I.AND COMMISSIONERS

'aOHN V, '!v.A'.Nir

IDAHO

-.ooviRNOR ~ns PRESIOENT

PETET, CENARRUSA
SECRETARY OF STATe

WAVNE L, KIOWELL
ATTORNltY Gli:r'4&:RAL
JOE R, WILLIAMS

DEPARTMENT OF LANDS

BOISE, IDAHO 83720

STATE AUDITOR
ROY TRUBV
SUP'T OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

GOflOON C TROMBLEY
OIRliCTOR

ENCROACHMENT PERMIT NO. ERL~95"S•f.72-A

Permission is hereby granted to
of

KOOHNAI COU!HV

----------------

Kout,ma1 County Courthous,i, Coeur d' AleM, to 03g14
ext<!nd concrete bo4t ramp 21' x

rn•

to construct and maintain

and r&flldc;e two docks: one O' x 40' & one O' x 51)'

to be located as follows:_~ooths Landing Pub11c PArk, ZOO' !:_11tween Lots 18 ,\ 19, Section
33, Townsrrff.l 50 North, R~_11ge 4 Hest, HM

Kootenai County

1.

Construction will follow details and specifications shown on the approved
drawings, and made a part hereof, together with any special conditions,
procedures or endorsements required by the Department appearing on attached
pages l through 3

2.

This permit does not convey the State's title to or jurisdiction or manage-·
ment of lands lying below the natural or ordinary high water mark.

3.

Acceptance of this permit constitutes permission by the permittee for representatives of the Department of Lands to come upon permittee's lands at all
reasonable times to inspect the encroachment authorized by this permit.

4.

The permittee assumes all liability for damage, which may result from the
exercise of this permit.

5.

All applicable provisions of the Rules for Regulation of Beds, Waters and
Airspace over Navigable Lakes and Streams ·in the State of Idaho, are incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof.

6,

The Director of the Department of Lands may cancel this permit for cause
upon notice and hearing as provided for in the adopted rules.

7, Thts penn1t dou not rel lave applicant from ot,ta1111ng addi ttonal local and
federa 1 penn1 ts e.s requ1 red.

FOR THE DIRECTOR

BY: ·------1t;El'l'II

TITLE:

d. -KitE:R,-··· - · - - - Stream & Lakebed Spechlfst

DATE:

7 March 1977

DL-1751-75
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Area
STATE OF IOAHO
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS
I.,_

APPLlt:ATION FOR A PERMI'f TO MAKE AN ENCROACHMENT
ON A NAVIGAllLE LAKE OR NAVIGAllLE STREAM
Pursuant to Adopted Rules
And Applicable Statutes
(TYPE OR PRINT IN INK)

1.

0({1'1:',..,,..

I

Name of a9.-rJieant

;,1

ffOOLen
~

Post office address), 0(/

c{1;_

Telephone number£

2.

Name of lake or stream:
tributary to

te.,

/

fl,'

7,'

0

YJ .YI

..C:-0 cf' c,.,.,.

CCJU"14'7

·~-

Ca<✓?J--6t C

dq,,-

.

Elevation of

4.

Property description

I;rl.,, .1,1
f/-/.LJLJ',• <:4/.,.,,Z..r/-i/.J..---

'
d ~,d/4 27. ,,__j'---_.,7,_c,(1-11a,-------------Mark

JJ....1.L ___

)!..A..t.l'l'CL.t,d~/c...,lf:!._,,J'_el'-''<Lz:Ll~-G(/L.!.;..::,??aA.11--✓
-l.2.£-<.?'-"'.6-'-"-lt.LL.1~·,L.1:2,:;...,;;17~:;k"--'k-'----7 l
l

-~-nL"'tJ
(1/16 or Lot no.) of Section

5,

-------------·-·

~======:==.:::..:.________________
High Water Mark ,2/ .;2 J"
Low Water

3.

Range _

.

_.,,;i.£-1!.#r,,/::.._________ , B.M. in

_.,.2Zc...i.?_______ ,

_/2 ~I' fen

Township ~ - _,

i/r..L·------

County.

Type of structure proposed (Please check):

Breakwater

_ _ _ _ _ _ Bulkhead

Dock

Piling

Fill

Boa thous~
C ')'f,:-, ,/

Ex~avation

c.,,-,, ,. H 1 e

other (Please Specify)

79v' •JJ,-p-

,/

6.

Length of encroachment waterward from High Water Mark

1,

Width. of encroachment at high water mark ~ - -

8,

Water depth at maximum -length at high water _ _,.__ _ _ __

I

-~c:;..,..,.u,<Z<----at maximum length

,

_Lz.____

I

Signature of a p p l i c a n ~ ~

d cr}.,:,:,,/4:,,

~

9.
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lclentiHcatlon l/~:
'
Area
STATE OF l.DAHO
DEPARTMENT OF LANDS

c'if L- rj--s -G72..
.{; fs-:__ S'_ -~,~

BU I:::, i;,

m'l.'U~l¥fBII l".I! A fl!ftlH'f 'fG JI' l'.P AN ENCROACHMENT
ON A NAVIGABLE LAKE OR NAVIGABLE STREAM

Pursuant to Adopted Rules
And Applicable Statutes
(TYPE OR PRINT IN INK)

s~,,?,i!

koo t e

C

o' /

.v ?z

Iy

L

Name of

2.

/2::,u•/., a•,./( C.ALJ/JLL-y C<?u ~./ //q v6"e
Telephone number 1{{ i/ - /?J.. 9/
Name of la1<.e or stream: Coe"'?:: cl//lene .1«4e

?1

i)

Post office address

tributary t o - = = = = = = = = = = = = = = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ __

3.

Elevation of High Water Mark

4.

Property description

J_/J. ,f

lio O t/, [ j

,,to"'inIle~"'"""'
d!.r tr L-f.r
(1/16 or Lot no.) of
Range

s.

/1 µ/

Low Water Mark

j?v/4//c,,· ~«.2:._/4___

<( ?,,

n
'
Section_..,;;..,..._•✓.,_______

V

Dock

_ _ _ _ _ _ Bulkhead

Boathouse

_ _ _ _ _ _ Fill

Excavation
_____
Other: (Please Specify)
p.41,. al;' olf/6/U.II I AIS/'4147'"/,,A/
/ '1~o
·
7, {ength of encroachment waterward from High Water Mark _,/.:s:<:iet.'".,,o:__'_ __

1, !, ~

t.

._!-_}/
.:2- .Qt.._ __

Type of structure p:_ _,,dd (Please check):

Piling

ft,

Townsh'p
•

, B, M, in _ /(,.0:...,<1~/~e=--?1"-'.'--"rlc...l<-·------- County,

Breakwater

t.

..,2.L'-'J..,..,_/____

1,

of encroachment at high water mark

n'
1---• at maximum length --~a..~--

Water depth at maximum -length at high water
Signature of applicant

,e,,.
~ h"d -<'----"-

~~

cl-

Date ~

'I,/ - I'J'S

_,

9tifibitS

am the owner of riparian or littoral proper.ty adjacent
to the pr
ted in this application, I am familiar with t e
the proposed'encroachment as
ans which I have initialed and I
offer no objection to the encroacl
0

e
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